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Abstract 
The United Nations Security Council has been of unique importance and authority in serving the maintenance of 
international peace and security, which puts it in a position integral to the functioning of international law and 
international relations. Yet, it is widely viewed as having had a mixed track record. At the time when the 
Security Council is considered to have played a very important role in remedying some international issues, it is 
also viewed to have failed in dealing with many others. Such failure is considered by many to be a direct result 
to the decision-making methodology of the Council, namely the veto power granted to the permanent five 
members of the Security Council. Therefore, such power has been the subject of many calls for Security Council 
reforms, which in some cases presented its abolition as one of the options to deal with what they deem as 
dysfunction of the Council. This study attempts to address the debate surrounding the veto power by outlining its 
rationale, and analyzing both sides of the debate in relation to its reform. It attempts to present a common ground 
for veto reform that could be more feasible for implementation in the presence of various obstacles in the current 
dynamics of international relations.    
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1. Introduction 
The United Nations (UN) was born out of the devastation of the World Wars, with a hope that the establishment 
of a strong international organization would create a level of cooperation between countries that could limit the 
chances of facing future conflicts.1 
To emphasize on this goal, the Security Council, one of the main organs of the UN, was established primarily 
with the mission of maintaining international peace and security using collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to international peace.2 
In this regard, the Security Council has the power to investigate situations to determine the existence of a threat 
to international security, and the right to decide on appropriate measures to deal with such a threat that can range 
from various economic sanctions to a full-scale military action.3 
The Security Council consists of fifteen members. Five of these members, namely the United Sates, the United 
Kingdome, France, China, and the Russian Federation; are permanent which enjoy the right to block decisions of 
the Council in what is referred to as the ‘veto’ right. The remaining members, who get one vote each in the 
Council, are elected based on specific geographical distribution for a period of two year. Any action taken of 
procedural nature by the Council must receive nine votes. However, substantive matters, which constitute the 
bulk of the Security Council’s work, must achieve the nine-vote majority without the veto of any of the 
permanent members.4 
While other organs in the UN make recommendations to member states, the Security Council enjoys an 
important and powerful position in the Organization, as the only organ that has the authority to make decisions 
that member states are obliged to obey.5 In addition, its authority penetrates into the powers of other organs of 
the UN. All General Assembly resolutions must be approved by the Security Council at one stage of its decision-
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making process, whether before or after the resolution. The Security Council also mandates the working agenda 
of the Secretariat, which could raise question marks over the issue of separation of powers in the UN that could 
affect its functions.1  
The structure and the decision-making mechanism of the Security Council was affected by the hard-bargaining 
process that shaped the UN Charter itself between the allied super powers at the end of the Second World War to 
reach the philosophical foundation of the UN of giving up the sole authority over the use of force to a single 
body that would ensure world peace in return.2  
In any international agreement, reaching a common understanding between states on a particular issue requires 
dealing with diverse, and in some instances, conflicting interests of participating states. The UN was not an 
exception. When the major powers, as emerged at the end of the Second World War, wanted to form an 
international body to bring stability to the world, the creation process had to accommodate their different views 
on how this new system should operate, more importantly, how their position was going to be in the new 
international regime.  
One of the issues that reflected the compromise reached to satisfy such interests of the super powers in the new 
system of international governance was the right exercise the veto in the Security Council. The existence of the 
veto right was so important to a degree that some super powers associated their participation in the new system 
with the right of a veto.3 In this context, it was routinely expressed that “small nations should not be allowed to 
complicate the supreme task of keeping the peace”.4  The US insisted on such powers to maximize the chance of 
achieving the approval of the Congress and avoid the same scenario that occurred earlier regarding its 
participation in the League of Nations.5 Similarly, the Soviet Union maintained an absolute position in relation to 
having an unrestricted power of the veto to a degree that it was one of the main key points that were going to 
determine their participation in the UN.6  
 
2. The Rationale of the Veto in the security Council 
The rationale of the veto, as expressed by the major powers, rest with the concept of unanimity.7 This concept, in 
the context of the UN’s functions and goals, means that in order for the UN to succeed, any of its acts must be 
unanimous to guarantee enlisting the resources and will of all great powers to serve the aims of the UN of which 
the maintenance of international peace and security takes the core position.8  
This rationale is outlined in the statements of the representatives of the major powers, who branded the 
unanimity of the major powers, represented by the veto, as a key factor to the survival of the UN itself.9 In this 
regard, the representative of the US stated that: 
The great powers could preserve the peace of the world if united…they could not do so if dissention 
were sowed among them. The great powers had every reason to exercise the requirement of unanimity 
for high and noble purposes, because they would not want again to expend millions in wealth and lives 
in another war.10 
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The representative of the Soviet Union pointed that “the agreement on a joint interpretation (that is of the veto 
power) would facilitate the creation of a truly effective and efficient international organization for the 
maintenance of peace.”1 While the representative of the UK said: 
The present voting provisions were in the interest of all states and not merely of the permanent 
members of the Security Council. Peace must rest on the unanimity of the great powers for without it 
whatever was built would be built upon shifting sands, or no more value than the paper upon which it 
was written. The unanimity of the great powers was a hard fact, but inescapable one. The veto power 
was a means of preserving that unanimity, and far from being a menace to the small powers, it was 
their essential safeguard. Without that unanimity all countries, large and small, would fall victims to 
the establishment of gigantic rival blocs which might clash in some future Armageddon. Cooperation 
among the great powers was the only escape from this peril; nothing was of comparable importance.2  
 
3. The problematic issue over the use of the veto power 
During the years of the Security Council there have been criticisms over veto practices by the five permanent 
members in the Security Council.3 The notion behind granting the permanent five members the veto power that 
such power was going to enable them to maintain world’s peace and better serve the goals and principles of the 
UN was diminishing. Instead, the veto practices of the permanent members have increasingly left the impression 
among the rest of the UN members that the veto power has been exercised in a selfish attitude that is based 
primarily on the idea of protecting the individual national interests of the permanent members and their allies.4 
The practices of the permanent members have been increasingly suggesting that they view such power as a free 
right that can be exercised by them in whatever manner they decide.5  
This attitude of the permanent members, and the impression of the rest of the UN membership were clearly 
evident during the years of the Cold War, which witnessed a head-on clash between the Western camp led by the 
US and the Eastern camp led by the Soviet Union that produced conflicting self-interests in all aspects of 
international policies, strategies, and self-ambitions.6 Such conflict of interests of the major powers of the UN 
resulted in using the veto power 263 times.7 Such what could be considered by many as abuse of power resulted 
in leaving the Council paralyzed by the Cold War, and unable to exercise its supposed role and take actions for 
most of the Cold War era, except for few noteworthy Council actions.8 
Now, more than 70 years after establishing the UN, its universal character and comprehensiveness have allowed 
it to maintain its status as the primary forum for countries to address international issues, and as a platform for 
collective actions to deal with such issues.9 However, many countries and observers around the world share the 
view, when the UN is concerned, that there is still a considerable gap between aspiration and real 
accomplishments, and that the world that decided the nature, structure, functions, and working methods of the 
UN has changed dramatically.10 These factors have contributed in initiating an old new debate on the need of the 
UN for reforms.   
 
The Security Council has always been the most controversial body of the UN, which contributed in putting it in 
the core of the reform debate.11 The Security Council’s calls for reform have focused on issues that include its 
effectiveness, openness, and procedures. However, the fact that the veto power has long been regarded as a 
source of non-action, positioned such power as a priority on the reform list.12 
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When the function of the Security Council is concerned, one could argue that despite some successes in its 
functions, its record is more distinguished by repeated failures to deal with various threats to peace and security, 
as a result of its inability to reach agreement among its members due mainly to the veto power enjoyed by the 
permanent members and their refusal to set aside their own interests.1 
The conflict of Syria and the deficiency of the Security Council to adopt effective measures to stop such conflict 
has highlighted the rationale behind the argument branding the Security Council as dysfunctional due primarily 
to the veto power. One could see the Syrian conflict as a good example of the veto at work, where the conflicting 
self-interests of the Security Council major powers have contributed to making what is seen by many in the 
world as a bloodshed that affect not only Syria but also many other countries; last many avoidable years.2  
However, even though the most recent Syrian conflict has been the one that sparked a surge in public attention 
accompanied by a need for reform, the Security Council proved ineffective during other high profile 
international events such as the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict, the Second Gulf War (Second Iraq War), and the 
NATO Kosovo Campaign, to mention few.3   
The absence of timely and decisive action by the Security Council has exacerbated the conflict of Syria. The 
strategic clash between Russia and China from one side and the US, UK, and France from the other side has 
contributed in the inability of the Security Council to end Syria’s civil war, which has resulted so far in hundreds 
of thousands of cases of people killed and millions of misplaced.4 The use of veto has been the ultimate tool to 
enforce the different interests resulted from the conflicting strategies of the permanent members of the Security 
Council.5 The continuing tenacious position of Russia, and to some extent China, of using the veto power against 
any Security Council resolution that is not, in any way, in tune with its strategy, has prompted other UN member 
states and international observers to put the veto power of the five permanent members under increased scrutiny, 
and question the legitimacy and efficiency of the Security Council itself.6  
This view was clear in the statement made by Liechtenstein’s representative to the UN during the 68th Session of 
the General Assembly themed with the Post-2015 Millennium Development Goals Framework, when it was 
stated that: 
Our inability to respond to the crisis in Syria demonstrates a crucial weakness in the system: the use of 
the veto, or its threat, in a manner incompatible with the purposes of the United Nations. This can make 
the Security Council irrelevant at times when it is most urgently needed.7 
While the veto has been one of the main reasons of the Security Council’s inaction in the Syrian conflict, it was 
also a reason for actions outside the legitimacy of the UN umbrella in other cases. The Second Gulf War, and the 
NATO Kosovo Campaign provide good example on how the stiffness in the decision-making process of the 
Security Council could push states to ignore the UN altogether and take unilateral actions when they feel that 
their fundamental interests are at stakes.8 Regardless to the rationale used to justify such actions, and the explicit 
or implicit international support for them, neutralizing the Security Council, which has the legitimate mandate, is 
considered as a very dangerous precedent that threatens not only the existence of the Security Council but also 
the UN as a whole.9  
The current experience in Syria and previous ones in Iraq and Kosovo indicate that the veto has been a reason for 
inaction, as it is the case in Syria, or for actions outside the scope of the Security Council and UN mandate, as it 
was the case with Iraq and Kosovo. Both consequences, however, undermined the role the Security Council was 
established for, and the purpose the veto power was granted to serve; in creating consensus towards collective 
actions that aim for the maintenance of international peace and security. They conflict with the rationale of 
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abandoning states of unilateral actions, which were considered as the main element that waged World Wars, in 
favor of unanimity which was viewed as the new safeguard for the world peace.    
This view was expressed by John Yoo, when he wrote, “{w}e appear to be returning to the era of Security 
Council paralysis, as demonstrated by the threatened vetoes of authorizations for the Kosovo intervention by 
Russia and the Iraq war by France and Russia.”1 This statement was even before the disastrous incompetence of 
the Security Council in dealing with the current Syrian atrocity, which only serve in reinforcing the mounting 
impression of the adverse effect of the veto power in the efficiency of the Security Council’s role. 
Presenting the Iraq War and the NATO Kosovo Campaign as examples, lead to the term of “pocket veto”, which 
refers to the threat of the use of veto, whether such threat was implicit or explicit.2 The threat of veto has been 
enabling the permanent members of the Security Council to achieve specific outcomes in relation to issues of 
their interests, whether through manipulating the language of resolutions intended to go for the voting of the 
Security Council, or keeping certain issues off the Council’s agenda altogether.3 The threat of veto prompts 
states to question the use of presenting a draft resolution for a Security Council decision, when they know in 
advance that such draft is going to be blocked as a result of a threat of the use of veto exercised by one or more 
of the Security Council’s permanent members. Among many other occasions, the outlined cases of Iraq and 
Kosovo show clearly how effective the pocket veto could be in pressuring the Security Council to act in a certain 
way or not to act at all. Therefore, one could argue that the adverse effect of the veto over the efficiency of the 
Security Council in exercising its intended role is not only in the use of the veto power per se, but in its existence 
in the system in the first place.  
 
4. The debate over the existence of the veto 
The above discussion presents the subject of the veto and the threat of its use in the Security Council as a fertile 
ground for debate. Such debate takes place with increasing views that the veto power pressures other members of 
the Security Council to comply with the demands of members who have such power to a degree that the veto-
bearing members are viewed to have shaped nearly all major international decisions that relate to the function of 
the Security Council since the establishment of the UN.4 
The veto has been the center point of debates concerning reforms in the Security Council, which vary from 
expanding its membership for more veto-wielding states, restricting its use by the current five permanent 
members, to abolishing the veto privilege altogether. Hence, it is important to analyze the rationale used to 
justify the dissatisfaction over the current veto-related situation, and whether such rationale provides an adequate 
ground for change, taking into account the parallel rationale in support of the current system.  
An argument could arise that the reason under which the veto was given as a privilege to the permanent members 
of the Security Council when the UN was established after World War II was to avoid the fate of the League of 
Nations.5 In this regard, the veto power was used as a tool to bind the major powers of the world at that time to 
the UN, and ensure that, by including such states in the Security Council permanently with the veto leverage, the 
role of the Council in maintaining international peace and security was going to be reinforced in order to avoid a 
repetition of events like World War II.6 Under this argument, abolishing the veto power could push the UN to 
end up with the fate of the League of Nations by prompting the major powers to abandon the Organization as a 
reaction to stripping off their most important leverage-ensuring power in the system.7  
Such argument, however, ignores the state of international politics and the symbolic meaning the UN currently 
presents as a source of legitimacy for actions taken in the international level.8 This means that it is unlikely that 
any state would risk leaving the UN for what that would have of a negative impact on the state’s own 
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legitimacy.1 Therefore, it is very questionable that the permanent five members would abandon the UN only 
because the veto power is abolished, making the notion of the UN collapse for this reason much less likely than 
it was when first established.2  
Saying that, however, no one can completely rule out the possibility that one or more of the permanent members 
leaving the UN as a result of abolishing the veto power, especially the US which has the potential capacity more 
than others in terms of its considerable international weight that allows it to do such action.3 Even if the 
permanent members decide not to take the drastic measure of opting out of the UN as a reaction to stripping 
them from the veto leverage, they could simply not participate in any action authorized by the Security Council. 
The reality of the current international dynamics still requires an active participation by the most powerful states 
in order to achieve international objectives, especially the ones related to world peace and security. The lack of 
participation in such issues by the major states would not be in the interest of the international community and 
the effective implementation of international collective measures, which could be argued to reaffirm the veto 
power as an incentive for their continuing engagement and contribution in the world security issues.    
An argument for the abolishment of the veto power might use the occasions under which the veto was the main 
factor for not adopting any action by the Security Council to deal with issues at hand to support their view that 
the abolishment of the veto would allow more measures to make it through the Security Council, enabling a 
better fulfillment of its mission, and greater credibility in the international system. This argument outlines the 
nature of the UN under which it exercises its role through “soft power” rather than “hard power” to support its 
position. Under the “soft power” approach of the UN, it gives or takes legitimacy to and from states’ actions by 
passing resolutions. This function is highly important in shaping the international system and regulating its 
interactions. The veto, however, weakens this function by blocking necessary UN resolutions intended to add 
legitimacy or take it away from actions that are seen as detrimental to the international system.  
On the other hand, the abolishment of the veto power might allow more resolutions to pass, but such resolutions 
would not be necessarily implemented. In other words, discarding the veto does not necessarily mean witnessing 
more actions on the ground, which is what really counts. The objection of one or more of the great powers to 
measures adopted by the UN Security Council would most probably prompt such power/s to take unilateral 
actions to paralyze the implementation of such measures.4 The UN would more likely be reluctant to go on a 
head-on clash with such major power/s, leaving a damaging effect on its credibility. Therefore, one might argue 
that the failure to adopt actions by the Security Council due to the veto blockage is an accepted compromise 
compared to the detrimental impact of being powerless in enforcing and implementing such actions.  
In the same context, it could be argued that the use of veto by the five major powers of the Security Council as a 
tool to prevent action declined compared to the Cold War Era, which witnessed an excessive use of the veto 
power to a degree that paralyzed the functions of the Security Council. Therefore, the veto has been used 
increasingly well, and its current negative impact on the international system has been minimal compared to the 
effect of a whopping 240 vetoes casted in the period between 1945 and 1990.5   
Despite the potentiality of the argument outlining the possibility of having a veto-stripped major power 
obstructing the implementation of the Security Council’s actions, it ignores the fact that those states are also 
aware of the adverse political consequences such obstruction might have on their international image.6 As a 
result of lacking the enforceability of the law in its traditional sense recognized by local laws, the international 
system relies to a degree on the moral pressure exercised by the international community on states going against 
the current and defying international consensus.7  
This has been one of the factors taken seriously into consideration by the major powers when vetoing a popular 
resolution even though they were exercising a legitimate authorized right.8 This should leave them even more 
reluctant in standing unrightfully in the way of implementing such popular action authorized by the Security 
Council in the absence of a veto power to avoid international condemnation or isolation, which is very important 
to the international status of states, especially the leading ones as they are generally viewed to have more 
responsibility in maintaining international stability.  
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In relation to the argument that the major powers have been more reasonable in exercising the veto compared to 
the paralyzing extensive use during the Cold War era, which enabled the Security Council to practice its role 
more efficiently; such argument is superficial. To argue that the sharp decrease in the use of the veto vote 
compared to its use during the Cold War period reflects more responsible attitude by the permanent members in 
their use of the veto power that enhances the efficiency of the security Council diminishes the role of the “Pocket 
Veto” in the decision-making process of the Council.  
The Pocket Veto, or the threat implicitly or explicitly of using the veto, has proved to achieve the same outcome 
as the actual use of the power.1 It allows the veto-threatening state to minimize the public attention and criticism 
normally associated with the veto vote, especially in popular resolutions, and force the issue subject of the 
resolution off the Council’s agenda at the same time, or at least tame it to what would be considered as 
acceptable for the veto-threatening state. Therefore, despite the decline in the use of the actual veto, there has 
been an increasing trend in the use of what could be referred to as the “masked veto” or threat of the use of the 
veto. 
To illustrate the role of the “pocket veto” in achieving desired outcomes for the permanent states in line with the 
outcomes achieved from the actual veto use, it is relevant to refer to France’s position during the Second Gulf 
War, where its constant threats of using its veto power to block any resolution for military intervention by the 
Security Council succeeded in preventing the US and the UK efforts to achieve such authorization from the 
Council.2 Russia and china, which are considered as the most frequent “pocket Veto” users among the permanent 
members, have also managed to put aside resolutions condemning the bloody crackdown of Syrian military 
forces on the pro-democracy protesters at the beginning of the Syrian conflict,3 before Russia decided to actually 
veto any resolution against its Syrian government ally in later stages, which has been one of the main factors that 
have been dragging the bloody conflict to a disastrous long period.  
Furthermore, it is understood in the legal context that the existence of a loophole in a legal text warrants its 
amendment to ensure the efficiency of such text in serving the purpose it was enacted for regardless to the idea 
of whether this loophole has been actually utilized or not. The potential adverse effect of using such loophole is a 
sufficient ground for change. This analogical reasoning applies on the veto power. The reference point in 
analyzing such power cannot only be in the frequency of its use, but also in its merits and potential effect of its 
existence in the first place.  
The veto-supporting view believes that vetoes and their threats are still not considered as a dead-end for UN 
actions, as any veto-related blockage could be bypassed through measures to be adopted in such cases, which 
diminishes the need for the elimination of the veto, as its impact is minimized in the presence of such measures.4 
This argument is based on the ability to resort to UN Resolution 377, which is also known as “Uniting for Peace” 
Resolution. The heart of the Resolution is contained in Part A, which states that  
The General Assembly…resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or 
act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making 
appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of 
the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.5   
 
Based on this, the veto and the threat of its use, which has the potential to paralyze the ability of the Security 
Council in taking any action could be dealt with by utilizing the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution for the purpose 
of fulfilling the duty of the Security Council in the maintenance of international peace and security when it fails 
to perform such duty.6 
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Even though such resolution has been rarely used, it played an integral role in making progress in instances of 
security Council’s halts, such as the high-profile case of the Suez Canal crisis, where a resolution for the 
withdrawal of France and Britain from the Suez Canal was vetoed by them, which prompted the call for an 
emergency “Uniting for Peace” session of the General Assembly that passed a resolution for the withdrawal after 
achieving the simple majority required vote, resulting in the actual withdrawal shortly after.1 Therefore, the 
existence of such measure disqualifies the need for the abolishment of veto, as it provides a maneuver to counter 
the use of veto or the threat of it, especially where popular resolutions that have great potential of gaining 
support of the General Assembly are involved.   
However, the argument viewing the “uniting for Peace” Resolution as an effective remedy to deal with cases of 
Security Council inaction due to the veto vote downplays the controversial status of such resolution regarding its 
practicality and even legality. The Resolution indicates the mandate of the General Assembly to interfere in 
matters relating to international peace and security that in the event under which the Security Council cannot 
exercise its role in maintaining international peace and security in a specific matter, this matter can be taken up 
by the General Assembly.2 The Resolution requires an expressed inability of the Security Council to exercise its 
duty in the maintenance of international peace and security as a result of lack of unanimity of the permanent 
members due to the veto vote.3 This deals almost exclusively with the cases where actual veto is exercised and 
led to the paralysis of the Council. It fails to acknowledge the impact of the threat of the use of veto, which has 
proved to have a considerable effect on the behavior of the security Council, through the softening of the 
resolutions’ language to a compromise acceptable to the veto-threatening state/s, but at the same time lacking 
behind in serving the original intended purpose of such resolutions. 
Furthermore, the legitimacy and legality of the Resolution is still the center of debate. The International Court of 
Justice explicitly confirmed substantive as well as procedural aspects of the UN General Assembly Resolution 
377 in its Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion, stating that Article 24 of the UN Charter conferred the primary but not 
the exclusive competence on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, and 
held that, inter alia, under Article 14 of the UN Charter, the General Assembly had the power to ‘recommend 
measures for the peaceful adjustment’ of various situations.4 However, there is still opposition to the legitimacy 
of the Resolution in providing the General Assembly the power to intervene in the outlined circumstances.5 Such 
opposition insist that the Security Council is the body in the UN with an exclusive competence to authorize 
collective action to counter threat to international peace and security.6 Despite the advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice, there are considerable views stressing that Article 24 of the UN Charter gives the 
Security Council the sole competence to act for the maintenance of international peace and security.7  
Such division over the legitimacy of the Resolution resulted in making states reluctant in its use, especially when 
a military intervention is involved.8 The idea of setting the Security Council aside is still considered by many as 
illegitimate, and that was reflected in the rare use of the resolution despite the many occasions in which the 
Security Council failed to exercise its role as a result of the veto, which should have warranted the utilization of 
the Resolution.9 
In addition, resolutions passed by the General Assembly are merely unbinding recommendations, which means 
that other than the moral weight it has as an action agreed on by the majority of the General Assembly’s 
members which could be effective in some instances, such resolutions fall behind in terms of enforceability 
when compared with Security Council’s resolutions.10  
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Therefore, although the “Uniting for Peace” Resolution has been hailed by some as a successful maneuver from 
the blockage in the Security Council’s decision-making process, the issues of its legitimacy, enforceability, and 
the rare utilization by states, leave doubts over its capability of being considered as a viable alternative to the 
role of the Security Council when such role is affected by the veto power. Hence, it cannot be much relied on in 
the rationale the downplays the need for reform in the Security Council decision-making process.  
 
5. Reforming the veto  
The issue of reforming the Security Council is one of the unending debates that has been discussed over the 
years to an extent that some describe it as old as the Council itself. The fundamental flows of the Council have 
prompted the majority of the UN Member States to call for such reform. The relationship between the Security 
Council and the General Assembly, which provides for a Council consisting of fifteen Members having a 
mandate on much of the functions of the General Assembly, which is the representative body of all UN 
Members, is one of the issues of interest in this regard.1 Other issues of interest in the reform debate include the 
transparency of the working procedures of the council, its size, the geographical representation of states in the 
Council, and its decision-making process.2 
When reforms on the decision-making process is concerned, the veto, the focus of this paper, presents itself as 
the most problematic issue worthy of reform. Proposals regarding the veto reform range from its extension to 
new permanent members, to its complete abolition, as well as proposals for restricting its usage.3 Reform 
proposals of the veto have been the most controversial and the least supported among other categories of 
Security Council reform.4 Discussions over the veto power seem to miss the substance of the issue represented in 
dealing with a problematic privilege that has been deemed for long responsible for the dysfunction of the 
Security council. Instead, reform efforts could be described mainly as a race for grabbing permanent seats in the 
Security Council.5 Questions of who should be added as permanent members or which part of the world would 
get more seats were the main attention-receiving issues in the permanent members/ veto related reform subject.6    
Subjecting the substance of the veto to reform is doubtful, as it is questionable if a reform that touches the heart 
of the issue will ever gain momentum, especially by the major powers, which are the ones benefiting from the 
current situation. However, even if the actual reform on the substance of the veto is still a distant goal, 
developing norms involving the limitation of the circumstances under which the veto can be used instead of 
actual legally binding limits is very much achievable.7    
The idea of a restraint on the use of the veto in mass atrocity situations, for example, provides a common ground 
that both sides of the veto debate should agree on. This idea was reflected clearly in the position of Liechtenstein 
in the 68th Session of the General Assembly themed with the Post-2015 Millennium Development Goals 
Framework, when it emphasized that  
Liechtenstein firmly believes in the Responsibility to Protect populations from atrocity crimes. Clearly 
we have so much work to do to put this norm into practice…All five Permanent Members should be able 
to give the world one public commitment: that they will not use their veto to block action aimed at 
ending or preventing atrocity crimes. This should be crucial to enhance the Council’s effectiveness – 
and its credibility8   
 
Therefore, with or without reform of the Security Council, atrocities such as, genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, and ethnic cleansing should be sidelined from the scope of the veto vote through an explicit or 
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implicit commitment by the permanent powers. Such commitment would not resolve all veto-related issues in 
the Security Council, as the blockage in the decision-making process would be more likely to continue in many 
cases in the future, which would continue to detriment the function of the Council, but such restraint in the use of 
veto in cases of atrocities, for example, would at least revive a role of the Security Council that has been 
considered by many to have been marginalized long time ago, the Responsibility to Protect.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
No matter to what side of the debate the person is in relation to the veto, or who makes a better sense in such 
debate between those who see it as a necessity that ensures an effective implementation to resolutions of the 
Security Council and those who view it as an outdated and unwanted leverage that proved in many instances its 
misuse and paralyzing effect; and regardless to the willingness and maturity of the current international political 
atmosphere for its reform, the reality of the current international situation demands a pause from all concerned 
parties in the international society.  
Many international situations headed by the ongoing atrocity in Syria present good examples as to the 
dysfunction that exists in the Security Council as the prime guarantor of international peace and security. 
Therefore, there have been increasing views that it is about time that the Security Council exercises such role, 
with or without reforms. The Security Council should live up to its Responsibility to Protect, which is in line 
with the declared intended purpose of guarding international peace and security. Developing a norm or a 
commitment on the restraint of the use of veto could contribute significantly in enhancing the role of the Council 
and better serve its Responsibility. Even though such restraint in the use of veto in certain cases would not be 
imposed by legally binding rules regulated in an amended Charter as a result to the sensitivity and complexness 
of an actual reform in this issue, practicing such norm would make a huge change in many current and future 
situations that affect primarily the weak and vulnerable.  
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